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Introduction 
The pending deployment of 3,600 U.S. troops from South Korea to Iraq sends a signal about U.S. 
policy priorities that both North and South Korea received. Even though North Korea has been a 
vexing U.S. foreign policy problem since 1950, has sought to develop a nuclear capability for over 
forty years, and recently declared its possession of nuclear weapons, it remains in Iraq's 
shadow.[1] 
The current nuclear crisis can trace its roots to five distinct events: President Bush's inclusion of 
the DPRK in the "Axis of Evil" in his 2002 State of the Union address, the new U.S. National 
Security Strategy, the U.S. global war on terrorism, the demise of the Agreed Framework, and 
North Korea's revelation of its possession of nuclear weapons. In February 2004, President Bush 
described the situation: 
In the Pacific, North Korea has defied the world, has tested long-range ballistic missiles, admitted 
its possession of nuclear weapons, and now threatens to build more. Together with our partners 
in Asia, America is insisting that North Korea completely, verifiably, and irreversibly dismantle its 
nuclear programs.[2]  
A typical policy debate proceeds with a claim that North Korea's latest game of brinkmanship is 
just another attempt to gain aid for bad behavior, and that there should be no more deals with 
North Korea. Opponents of taking a hard line with North Korea highlight U.S. failures to comply 
with portions of the 1994 Agreed Framework and to the unimaginable devastation that a second 
Korean War—one where both sides have nuclear weapons—could cause. While most agree on 
the desire for a nuclear free North Korea, no one has a simple solution. 
There are four general policy options available to the United States: incentive-based diplomacy, 
coercive diplomacy, military force, or acceptance of a nuclear-armed North Korea. Diplomacy is 
the first step toward conflict resolution, and its success would eliminate the need for more 
aggressive policies that could lead to war, but most observers doubt a diplomatic solution is 
possible for such a difficult issue, given the intractable positions of both sides. In light of President 
Bush's February 2004 remarks, the assumption is that America will not accept a nuclear-armed 
North Korea. But as instability in Iraq continues to drain limited U.S. military resources, domestic 
patience, and international support, the Bush administration is further constrained in its policy 
alternatives.  
The Epicenter of Northeast Asia  
The Korean Peninsula is the geopolitical epicenter of Asia. Five of the top fourteen economic 
powers and four of the ten largest armies in the world are within six hundred miles of each other. 
Seoul and Pyongyang are 111 nautical miles apart, separated by the most heavily armed area on 
the planet.[3] The Korean demilitarized zone (DMZ) divides two countries that are not at peace, 
but rather co-exist under a 1953 armistice that has witnessed thousands of violations and 
hundreds of deaths. Like other epicenters, Korea rumbles periodically: the 1968 USS Pueblo 
seizure, the 1994 nuclear crisis, and the DPRK's recent declaration that it possesses nuclear 
weapons all sent shockwaves through the region. The magnitude of the fault lines linking the 
United States, China, North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and Russia are enormous and span 
political, cultural, economic, and military categories. U.S. vital interests in the region include 
500,000 citizens, 100,000 troops, and $500 billion in annual trade.[4] Maintaining security and 
stability is paramount to U.S., Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese interests. However, regional 
stability continues to be problematic.  
One example of instability in the region is North Korea's relations with Japan. Japan's brutal 
colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945 left indelible marks on Korean society. North Korea's 
extensive methamphetamine trafficking and its acknowledgement that it kidnapped Japanese 
citizens for two decades heightened tension in an already troubled relationship. Pyongyang is 
seven hundred nautical miles from Tokyo—mere minutes of missile flight time. North Korea's 
proximity to Japan provides opportunity, its missiles provide a threat, and its public statements 
display hostile intent. North Korea's threat to turn Tokyo into a "sea of fire" caused Japanese Diet 
Member Shingo Nishimura to comment, "[T]here is no bigger threat than that."[5] With hundreds 
of missiles, including No Dong missiles with an eight hundred mile range, North Korea can strike 
all countries in Northeast Asia.[6] In addition, North Korea's September 1998 Taepo Dong I test 
demonstrated over 1,000 mile range along with multi-stage missile capability.[7] Japan showed 
considerable restraint following the missile test, but Northeast Asia is rumbling again following the 
complete breakdown of the Agreed Framework, the new U.S. National Security Policy, and North 
Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).  
U.S. Policy  
Assumptions 
The United States is committed to preventing Kim Jong-il from using, threatening to use, or 
selling nuclear weapons. In accomplishing this objective, U.S. policy options are constrained by 
key regional partners. For example, U.S. State Department officials refer to the three "No's" that 
China and the United States agreed upon with respect to common goals for North Korea: no 
nuclear weapons, no war, no collapse. In developing alternative strategies for resolving the 
current crisis, however, strategists should not rule out any policy option prior to submission for 
debate, selection, and approval. In addition, if the United States will not accept a nuclear-armed 
North Korea and diplomacy ultimately fails, how should the United States proceed? For these 
reasons, it is essential to consider military force. The basis for eliminating accepting North Korean 
nuclear weapons as a policy option are President Bush's numerous statements reflecting his 
desire to protect the United States from the Axis of Evil, his policy preference for action versus 
inaction, and his personal distaste for Kim Jong-il.[8]  
Goals 
U.S. policy objectives for North Korean nuclear weapons include complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible nuclear disarmament.[9] The United States cannot permit a country with North 
Korea's record of state-sponsored terrorism, human rights violations, and arms sales to possess 
and threaten the use or sale of nuclear weapons. At the heart of any solution will be a verification 
mechanism that meets the requirements of the United States, North Korea, and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). However, North Korea's difficulty in accepting even low levels of 
transparency was apparent in its April 2004 handling of the train disaster near Ryongchon. With 
its self-reliance ideology known as juche, North Korea has several reasons for remaining isolated.  
Why did North Korea toil for four decades to develop nuclear weapons? Some strategists argue 
that in order to formulate precise policy, it is necessary to understand North Korea's motivation for 
building nuclear weapons. Blackmail, black-market, deterrence, or detonation is an easy memory 
aid to describe four potential explanations. North Korea may intend to blackmail the United States 
into providing security guarantees, humanitarian aid, or energy assistance by threatening to 
detonate or sell its nuclear weapons. North Korea's foremost policy goal is regime survival. 
Accordingly, the most logical explanation for its pursuit of nuclear weapons is to deter what it 
perceives to be a U.S. desire to overthrow its government with military force. The risk of selling or 
using its nuclear weapons is what spurs the United States into action.  
Constraints 
In light of blowback from perceived U.S. unilateral action in Iraq and the vital interests of regional 
partners, the United States must follow a multilateral approach in its conduct of Northeast Asia 
policy. The United States cannot afford to alienate China while attempting to coerce North Korea. 
From a pragmatic standpoint, China's military and economic strength poses a significant obstacle 
if it disagrees with U.S. policy. In fact, China is in a position to help. China's significant leverage 
over North Korea stems from coal and oil exports which comprise approximately 80 percent of 
North Korea's energy resources.[10]  
North Korea's military forces and ballistic missiles also hold major South Korean and Japanese 
cities at risk. Seoul's metropolitan area of over nineteen million is well within range of thousands 
of artillery pieces and Tokyo's metropolitan area of thirty-one million has been threatened by 
North Korean rhetoric (e.g., the "sea of fire" remark) and military capabilities (e.g. the 1998 Taepo 
Dong I missile test over Japan). South Korea's partnership with the United States has long been 
viewed as the center of gravity that North Korea intends to divide and the United States struggles 
to maintain. The January 1998 inauguration of former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung 
limited the policy options available to the United States. Kim's Sunshine Policy encouraged 
dialogue, reconciliation, and confidence building between the two Koreas. South Korea's current 
president, Roh Moo-hyun, met with President Bush in May 2003, and their very limited 
"agreement on further steps" to resolve the nuclear crisis had the roar of a butterfly. Although 
President Bush enjoyed an approval-rating surge for firm leadership following the attacks of 11 
September 2001, he is constrained by 2004 reelection concerns and questions regarding pre-war 
intelligence on Iraq.  
Policy Evaluation  
In order to compare and contrast policy options, I propose four selected criteria to measure the 
impact of U.S. policy choices: the impact on North Korea's nuclear weapons, the impact on North 
Korea's neighbors, price, and precedent. 
Because U.S. policy seeks to achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible North Korean nuclear 
disarmament, the first and foremost consideration is how policy impacts the status of current 
North Korean nuclear weapons and the country's capability to develop future nuclear weapons. 
This includes not only North Korea's already acknowledged plutonium production, but also its 
currently disavowed highly enriched uranium path to nuclear weapons. The first step is full 
disclosure while freezing production, followed by verification, and then ultimately dismantling any 
current weapons. 
Since U.S. policy options will be constrained by the proximity to and strength of North Korea's 
neighbors, it is necessary to analyze the impact of each policy on its neighbors: China, Japan, 
and South Korea. Russia's relatively minimal role and limited ability to leverage North Korea's 
actions marginalizes its impact on the crisis.[11] 
As with any U.S. policy, the president is ultimately responsible for explaining the cost of his 
choices to American taxpayers. Costs will not only be measured in treasure, but also in the 
potential loss of life. Lives will be lost most obviously in a second Korean War scenario; however, 
coercive diplomacy such as economic sanctions can also lead to civilian casualties. One coercive 
policy implementation problem in North Korea is the leadership's ability and willingness to 
insulate themselves from the effects of sanctions. Finally, risk analysis is a paramount 
consideration in policy selection. North Korea has repeatedly threatened a military response to 
either United Nations Security Council resolutions or economic sanctions. Furthermore, the 
United States cannot sit idly while North Korea develops nuclear weapons because of the high 
risk of resulting nuclear proliferation in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. 
How the world resolves the current North Korean nuclear crisis will affect future nuclear 
proliferation cases. Nuclear nonproliferation has been an objective of the United States and the 
United Nations since the development of nuclear weapons. On 5 March 1970, the nuclear 
nonproliferation treaty (NPT) codified international support for halting the spread of nuclear 
weapons. The NPT regime has had numerous successes such as South Africa and Ukraine, but 
it has no answer for non-signatory countries that have developed nuclear weapons such as India, 
Pakistan, and Israel. North Korea is what former Secretary of Defense William Perry referred to 
as, "the poster-child of proliferation problems."[12] Forced to enter the NPT in December 1985 by 
the Soviet Union, North Korea threatened to withdraw in March 1993. North Korea's second 
threat to withdraw actually became effective on 10 April 2003, after it kicked out IAEA inspectors, 
and was the first country to ever deny IAEA requests for special inspections.  
Summary of Policy Analysis 
North Korea remains an enigma and the multilateral approach is both a blessing and a curse. The 
blessing comes from possible increased pressure on North Korea to comply with regional 
demands for a diplomatic solution to the nuclear crisis. The curse is in the fact that with incentives 
likely to fail, a multilateral coercive approach or military force in the current strategic situation has 
little hope of success due primarily to a lack of regional support. Herein lays the policy challenge; 
if North Korea cannot be enticed, coerced, or clubbed over the head, how should the United 
States proceed?  
The Carrot: Not Tasty Enough  
The Agreed Framework was the best of only bad options available in 1994; and it failed to 
remove North Korea's incentive to develop nuclear weapons or to permit significant increases in 
transparency. A similar approach in the current situation is unlikely due to the current U.S. 
administration's predominant belief that North Korea cannot be trusted. Moreover, North Korea 
has repeatedly balked at permitting increased levels of inspections regardless of the nationality of 
the inspectors or the organization they represent. North Korea's refusal to accept U.S. demands 
for increased transparency, and the requisite inspections, is the primary reason diplomacy will 
most likely fail to disarm a nuclear North Korea. An incentive-based solution would be the least 
expensive in the long-term and has the greatest regional support. However, incentive-based 
diplomacy will not entice North Korea to surrender the nuclear weapons in which it has invested 
so heavily and views as the penultimate deterrent to U.S. military force and the source of 
achieving "great power status."  
The Stick: Too Many Hands, Wrong Target 
With its low success rate, coercive diplomacy lacks the regional support necessary to conduct 
multilateral coercion successfully. In addition, coercion would affect the wrong target and has the 
same transparency problems as incentive-based diplomacy. North Korean leaders are hyper-
insulated from an already suffering population. Virtually cut off from all economic interaction with 
the United States, North Korea continues to receive reliable assistance from China and bilateral 
trade with South Korea. Unless North Korea provokes the regional powers or increases tension 
with brinkmanship, it is unlikely that China and South Korea would support cutting North Korea off 
economically, thus limiting the United States' ability to strangle North Korea.  
The Sledgehammer: Potentially Effective, but Blunt and Expensive 
A second Korean War could be won by Combined Forces Command (CFC) and would provide 
the highest level of control over North Korean nuclear weapons; however, its costs are excessive 
and U.S. regional partners oppose the use of force. Seoul and Tokyo are immediately at risk to 
North Korean artillery and ballistic missiles, respectively. The American public does not perceive 
a significantly high enough threat from North Korea's possession of nuclear weapons to spend 
billions and endure military losses in the tens of thousands.[13] A second Korean War also 
implies North Korean regime change, generates several negative consequences, and risks a 
limited nuclear exchange.  
The list of obstacles to the use of military force is long. A lack of regional support to discuss, let 
alone use military force, international blowback from Iraqi pre-war intelligence failures and 
perceived U.S. unilateral preemptive war, U.S. domestic concerns with the cost of Iraqi 
reconstruction, and the assured destruction of Korea's infrastructure, removes it as a feasible 
U.S. policy option at the present time. Moreover, Pentagon officials recently confirmed that 
approximately 3,600 U.S. soldiers from the second combat maneuver brigade, stationed in South 
Korea, will deploy to Iraq for one year. No decision has been released regarding if they will deploy 
with their Abrams tanks and Bradley fighting vehicles or if they will return to South Korea after 
serving in Iraq. This move is not as military significant as it is diplomatically. A credible threat of 
force is crucial to successful coercive diplomacy. In light of these recent events and increasing 
U.S. commitments in Iraq, North Korea is unlikely to believe that the United States is willing to risk 
simultaneous military operations in both the Middle East and Asia. To make a credible threat, the 
United States must still be politically and militarily ready to execute if North Korea calls the bluff. 
Delays in disarming North Korea's nuclear weapons provide its leaders time to increase the 
stockpile. It is time for the six party talks to produce tangible results. If not, the United States 
needs to apply just enough stick to convince North Korean leaders that the carrots being offered 
are more palatable than a sledgehammer applied to the head. Presented with the examples of 
Libya or Iraq, which policy option would North Korea prefer? Is this a valid comparison or are the 
strategic situations radically different? Should coercion fail, the United States must be ready to 
follow through on its threat of military action to disarm North Korea of its nuclear weapons 
completely.  
Policy Recommendations 
The United States successfully took the first step by achieving regional agreement for its policy 
objective: complete, verifiable, and irreversible North Korean nuclear disarmament. The next 
most important step for U.S. policymakers is to answer the second question Richard Armitage's 
working group asked in 1999, "What price is the United States willing to pay to disarm North 
Korea?"[14] If the answer to this question does not include risking a second Korean War, then the 
United States should not pursue coercive diplomacy. Coercive diplomacy assumes a credible 
threat of military force, sometimes combined with incentives, to achieve political objectives. To 
threaten North Korea with the use of military force, either limited strikes, or major combat 
operations, and then not follow through would be worse than simply accepting a nuclear North 
Korea and continuing deterrence. If a second Korean War is rejected as an acceptable policy to 
disarm North Korean nuclear weapons and incentive based diplomacy fails, the United States 
should attempt to mitigate further nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia while continuing to deter 
North Korea from invading the South. Although inexpensive in the near term, accepting a nuclear-
armed North Korea simply postpones a difficult decision that will be more costly to resolve in the 
future and places U.S. vital interests in Northeast Asia at an unacceptably high level of risk in the 
present.  
Each policy option alone will fail to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons. Currently, the only 
politically feasible alternative is the judicious use of just enough stick to convince North Korea to 
take the carrots offered before the deal expires. However, time is on the side of North Korea. 
North Korea can work quietly while observing the recent South Korean opposition party's success 
in the April elections and the upcoming U.S. presidential elections in November 2004. With each 
passing day, allows North Korea to pursue nuclear weapons without international inspections, 
providing it the opportunity to build an even greater deterrent.  
The United States must convince China and South Korea that disarming North Korea is a vital 
interest to not only the United States, but also Northeast Asia and that if not addressed soon, 
nuclear proliferation throughout Asia will become the world's concern. The six party talks should 
not continue indefinitely without tangible results. Following Vice President Cheney's April 2004 
trip to Northeast Asia, Chinese leaders summoned Kim Jong-il to a meeting in Beijing that 
included President Jintao. The South Korean press reported that China stressed the importance 
of continuing the six-party talks and that Kim Jong-il should be more flexible in negotiating with 
the United States.[15] An allegation also circulates that China gave North Korea economic 
assistance for simply traveling to Beijing and publicly stating that it would continue meaningful 
dialogue at the six party talks. Multilateral diplomacy is the proper path, but it should be walked 
briskly in order to determine its chance for success without allowing North Korea unlimited time to 
build more nuclear weapons. 
Regardless of the outcome of the November 2004 Presidential election, the next administration 
should decide if it wants to shift from talks to coercion. It is vital that this critical foreign policy 
decision be thoroughly vetted with a wide range of experts, inputs, and policy options, including a 
review of the Perry Report and Armitage recommendations. Aggressive U.S. policy in Northeast 
Asia could easily escalate to a second Korean War; accordingly, it is necessary to measure both 
Congressional and public support. If Congress and the American people believe North Korean 
nuclear weapons are a threat to U.S. vital interests, then they need to realize the policy's potential 
costs. Whatever the policy debate outcome, a clear and credible policy should be ready for 
implementation immediately following the Presidential election, since delays favor North Korea. If 
the decision is to pursue coercive diplomacy, the next step is to reaffirm precisely what to 
demand of North Korea. 
Due to consensus with regional partners, it is likely the United States will continue to demand 
North Korea's complete, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear disarmament, and not publicly 
advocate North Korean regime change. The next step would be to develop and communicate a 
credible threat based upon realistic military capabilities within the constraints of very limited 
regional support. For example, in order to conduct operations from Japan in preparation for 
limited South Korean support it is necessary to draft contingency plans. Actual force deployments 
into the region, similar to Pacific Theater buildups prior to operations in Iraq to deter North Korean 
opportunistic aggression, must back the threat of military force. However, the timing and extent of 
force buildup requires careful planning and execution. Operations in Iraq placed a tremendous 
strain on U.S. forces, military logistics, and public support. Likewise, increasing troop strength in 
the Korean Theater heightens tension not only with North Korea, but also South Korea, China, 
and to some extent Japan. However, if properly executed, these buildups could accomplish three 
objectives. First, they would support the coercive threat. Second, they would be better prepared 
to conduct operations either to demonstrate U.S. resolve or to counter North Korean aggression. 
Finally, their redeployment out of the theater becomes bargaining chips for U.S. policymakers 
negotiating with North Korean leaders.  
In communicating the threat of military action to North Korea, the United States should invite as 
many senior North Korean leaders as possible to review U.S. capabilities in South Korea and 
force demonstrations in the United States. The purpose of these displays would be to 
demonstrate clearly that the threat of U.S. military force is credible. Furthermore, that U.S. forces 
employed on the Korean peninsula would be overwhelming, lethal, precise, and victorious. The 
format for these military demonstrations could be similar to Air Power Demonstrations previously 
conducted near Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada for high-ranking U.S. leaders such as members of 
Congress and all new flag rank officers in the U.S. military.  
After communicating a credible threat, the United States should offer incentives that allay North 
Korea's fears and meet its dire energy and food needs. Providing incentives, that some refer to 
as an "exit ramp," allows Kim Jong-il a face-saving way out of his nuclear dilemma. This is 
especially important when dealing with an insecure leader of a failed state who aspires to be a 
"great power," especially when Korean culture places great emphasis on pride. Although 
President Bush has stated he will not permit America to be blackmailed, when faced with either a 
second Korean War or accepting a nuclear North Korea, providing incentives may appear easier 
to swallow when offered after the threat of force. Future incentive decisions should consider the 
pros and cons of continuing construction of the 1994 Agreed Framework's two light water 
reactors or scrapping these programs for alternative energy sources. Since North Korea objected 
to South Korean workers being permitted inside North Korea to build the light water reactors, 
China could potentially assist North Korea in rebuilding its electrical infrastructure or an 
alternative energy source using South Korean and Japanese funding. Finally, the United States 
must determine a deadline for North Korea's compliance and be militarily and politically prepared 
to execute its declared threat.  
U.S. policy will need to be "sold" both internationally and domestically. Absent a significant threat, 
the average American largely ignores U.S. foreign policy. The war in Iraq increased concern over 
intelligence accuracy and the viability of preemptive wars in pursuit of the "Axis of Evil." United 
Nations support for either coercion or military force to disarm North Korea will be more difficult to 
sell than the failed attempt to rally support for the Iraq War. A Chinese veto of any proposed 
resolutions condemning North Korea or a call for an aggressive policy that it does not support is 
almost a certainty. Domestically, building support for a potential second Korean war would be 
difficult at best. The average American has little interest in foreign policy and does not perceive 
North Korea as a threat to Homeland Security. If a North Korean nuclear weapon sold to Al 
Queda and detonated at the Superbowl had Kim Jong-il's fingerprints on it, America would 
mobilize. Short of that, many Americans wonder why the United States should risk killing tens of 
thousands of people to remove a threat that young South Koreans fail to perceive. It is necessary 
to use credible evidence of North Korea's record of illicit activities and human rights violations to 
inform the American people and the international community of the repressive nature of Kim 
Jong-il's regime. Although Iraqi pre-war intelligence tarnished the United States' reputation, it 
must pursue international and domestic support by convincing people that North Korea does, in 
fact, have nuclear weapons and that this is unacceptable.  
If both incentive and coercive diplomacy fail to disarm North Korean nuclear weapons, the steps 
taken during coercive diplomacy will better position the United States to conduct military 
operations at the time and place of its choosing to disarm North Korea. Ideally, this would occur 
with at least South Korea's tacit support and China's promise to remain neutral. However, military 
planners should prepare for the worst, and have contingency plans that assume no offensive 
operations from South Korea and that China may provide North Korea assistance short of 
employing military force. Among the myriad of considerations, strategists should avoid creating 
situations that are likely to trigger North Korean employment of nuclear weapons. In addition, they 
should attempt to convince senior North Korean military leaders that the outcome of war is not the 
question, but rather how much destruction they wish to endure. Psychological operations always 
play a role in military conflict, but the potential impact of exposing Kim Jong-il's leadership 
failures, repressive actions, and economic incompetence could convince North Korean military 
leaders that the Libyan model is a better alternative than Iraq. 
Summary 
The two alternatives available if diplomacy fails are both unattractive. However, the United States 
should not shy away from protecting its vital interests because a potentially effective policy is 
costly. If after being informed of the potential costs of military force, Congress and the American 
people still support the U.S. objective of complete, verifiable, and irreversible North Korean 
nuclear disarmament, the United States should act immediately. In addition, U.S. diplomats 
should make every effort to convince our regional partners that the benefits of supporting U.S. 
and regional policy goals outweigh the costs of opposing them. At the end of the day, however, 
U.S. leaders are likely to conclude that containing a nuclear-armed North Korea is better than a 
second Korean War. Of course, policy makers want to avoid having to present the President with 
this stark choice. But if diplomacy fails to disarm a nuclear North Korea, advisers must be clear 
which of the two choices is preferable. Instead of providing the perfect template by which to 
coerce North Korea, U.S. policy in Iraq may have not only cast a shadow on the Korean policy 
side show, but blocked out the sun entirely. Hopefully, when the light shines again inside North 
Korea, the United States is not forced by an increased nuclear weapon status quo into a policy of 
containment. 
 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights 
home page. 
To have new issues of Strategic Insights delivered to your Inbox at the beginning of each 
month, email ccc@nps.edu with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your 
address will be used for no other purpose. 
About the Author 
Air Force Major Dan Orcutt will graduate with a Master's in National Security Affairs from the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School in September 2004. His master's thesis weighs U.S. policy options to 
resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. 
References 
1. Stephen Kim, "North Korea" in Proliferation Challenges After Iraq, ed. Robert Litwak and 
Mitchell Reiss, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center for International Studies, December 
2003), 6. 
2. George Bush, "Remarks by the President on Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation," 
speech delivered to National Defense University, Washington, D.C., 11 February 2004.  
3. Congress, House, Asia-Pacific Subcommittee on International Relations, testimony by Admiral 
Fargo, Commander Pacific Command, 26 June 2003. 
4. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, January 2001), 7. 
5. Shingo Nishimua, interview by Eric Weiner (07 March 2003), National Public Radio Transcript. 
6. Proliferation: Threat and Response, 11. 
7. Ibid. 
8. The Axis of Evil reference occurred in the 2002 State of the Union address. Policy Preference 
for action versus inaction comes from the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, December 2002, p. 1. President Bush's distaste for Kim Jong-il was reported by 
Washington Post's Bob Woodward from a summer 2002 interview quoted in The CQ Researcher 
13, no. 14 (11 April 2003), 324. 
9. George Bush, speech to NDU, 11 February 2004.  
10. Stephen Kim, "North Korea," 8. 
11. Ibid., 7. 
12. William J. Perry, "North Korea: The Real Nuclear Crisis," Speech at Monterey Institute of 
International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies. (16 December 2003). 
13. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Indianapolis: Basic Books, 2001), 315. 
14. David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington, 
D.C.: ISIS Reports, 2000), 315.  
15. Jim Yardley, "North Korean Leader tells China He's Committed to Nuclear Talks," New York 
Times (22 April 2004). 
 
